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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of Florida decided three cases this past year
involving juveniles, all in the delinquency field involving significant but
technical matters.' In the first case, the court held that it was necessary to prove
that a school police officer was the designee of the school principal in order for
a juvenile to be adjudicated for committing trespass on school grounds.2 In the
second case, the court held, over a dissent, that a juvenile who committed
several acts of indirect criminal contempt could be sentenced to consecutive
periods of secure detention for each of the two offenses, 3 thus resolving a
conflict in the district courts of appeal.4 In the third case, the court held that a
juvenile detention center falls within the criminal law definition of a detention
facility.
The intermediate appellate courts were quite busy in the juvenile
delinquency field, deciding both important issues and also reversing regretful
fundamental errors by the trial courts.6 In the dependency and termination of
parental rights ("TPR") field, the appellate courts were less busy, but
. Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. This
survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013. The
author thanks law librarian Robert Beharriell, Esq. for his help in the preparation of this survey.
J.M. v. Gargett (J.M. II), 101 So. 3d 352, 355 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam);
I.
Hopkins v. State (Hopkins II), 105 So. 3d 470,471 (Fla. 2012); J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427,42728 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
JR., 99 So. 3d at 428.
2.
CompareJM. II, 101 So. 3d at 356, with JM. II, 101 So. 3d at 357
3.
(Quince, J., dissenting).
JM. II, 101 So. 3d at 353, 357. Compare J.M. v. Gargett (JM.1), 53 So. 3d
4.
1245, 1248 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted,58 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 2011), (unpublished table
decision), aff'd, 101 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam), with M.P. v. State, 988 So. 2d 1266,
1267 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Hopkins II, 105 So. 3d at 471.
5.
P.R. v. State, 97 So. 3d 980, 981, 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012); G.G. v.
6.
State, 84 So. 3d 1162, 1163-64 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).

82

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

nonetheless, decided several important cases. And again, some of the opinions
involved rudimentary trial court error.
II.

DEPENDENCY

Issues regarding non-offending parents come up regularly in the
appellate decisions in Florida, including issues of due process.9 In A.S. v.
Department of Children & Family Services (hI re Interest of E.G-S.),'o a
dependency petition was filed against a mother who was divorced and in which
the petitioner made no allegation against the father.' After a trial on the
petition, the court found the child dependent and ordered the child placed with
the non-offending father, terminated its jurisdiction along with Department of
Children and Families' ("DCF" or "Department") supervision. 2 The mother
based her appeal on a violation of her due process rights, resulting in the court's
termination ofjurisdiction and supervision, without a hearing.' 3 The appellate
court agreed.' 4 The mother was entitled to notice that the court would
determine the child's permanent placement at the dispositional hearing, and
further that "a court may not place [the] child permanently with [the] nonoffending parent when the offending parent is either in substantial compliance
with [the] reunification . .. plan or the time for compliance has not expired."
The court then remanded for an "evidentiary hearing to determine whether
allowing the case to remain pending while [the mother] complete[d] her case
plan would be detrimental to the child's interest, and . . . whether a

preponderance of the evidence support[ed] changing the goal of [the] case plan"
to custody for the father.' 6
In F.O. v. Department of Children & Families," a father appealed an
order after the adjudicatory hearing found no evidence that he abused,
abandoned, or neglected the children, and entered the mother consent plea to the
petition for dependency.'" The problem was that the trial court nonetheless

7.
8.
9.
(2011) [hereinafter
10.
I1.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Parts 11, III.
See id.
See Michael J. Dale, 2011 Survey ofJuvenile Law, 36 NOVA L. REV. 179, 180
Dale, 2011 Survey ofJuvenile Law].
113 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 80.
In re Interest of E.G-S., 113 So. 3d at 79.
Id. at 80.
94 So. 3d 709 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 709-10.
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ordered the father to participate in the case plan.' 9 Relying upon two earlier
intermediate appellate court decisions, but without any discussion, the appellate
court held that even when the parent had not been found to have abused,
neglected, or abandoned the child at issue, the parent could be ordered to
participate in the case plan. 20
In M.P. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of
TB. & T.P.), 2 1 the issue was whether temporary legal custody could be shared
with DCF in a case where the dependency adjudication by consent was made as
to the father, but an order of dependency was withheld as to the mother, except
for the case plan for the children.2 2 In its order, the trial court determined that
remaining in the mother's custody, with protective supervision, was in the best
interests of the children.23 However, the order also determined that the mother
"share temporary physical custody of the children" with the DCF.24 Given the
trial court's grant of legal custody of the children to the mother, it was
reversible error to also order temporary physical custody of the children to the
Department.25
Once parents have completed tasks assigned to them pursuant to a case
plan after a finding of or consent to dependency, they may seek reunification
with their children. 2 6 However, a trial court must determine if the parents
"compli[ed] with the case plan" and if "reunification [is] detrimental to the
child" before considering an order of reunification.27 In addition, "[t]he court is
also [obligated] to make written . .. findings as to the six statutory factors."28 In
Department of Children & Families v. W.H.,29 the trial court failed to make
findings on a number of the statutory factors. 30 Nor was there competent
evidence in support of finding the factors; DCF did not have notice that a
hearing may result in the possibility of reunification, and no evidence of the

Id. at 710.
19.
20.
Id.
21.
107 So. 3d 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 516.
22.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
Id. at 516-17.
25.
26.
FLA. STAT. § 39.522(2) (2013); see also id. §§ .521(d)(9), .6011(1).
27.
Id. § 39.522(2); Dep't of Children & Families v. W.H., 109 So. 3d 1269,
1270 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting C.D. v. Dep't of Children & Families,
974 So. 2d 495, 500 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
28.
FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10); W.H., 109 So. 3d at 1270.
109 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
29.
Id. at 1270.
30.
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issue was presented at trial." The appellate court reversed given the absence of
both notice and "an evidentiary hearing on reunification." 3 2
In State Department of Children & Families v. B.D.," the trial court

adjudicated the child dependent and placed the child with her maternal cousin as
permanent guardian.34 Subsequently, the mother's motion was granted and
DCF was ordered to reinstate protective supervision, "without scheduling or
holding an evidentiary hearing or setting out specific findings of fact."35 From
that order, the Department sought certiorari. The appellate court issued a writ
quashing the trial court's order. 37 The appellate court opined that the trial court
order departed from the essential requirements of law as it "failed to make
specific, required findings of fact addressing the child's best interest[s], stating
the circumstances that caused the . . . dependency, and explaining [why the]

circumstances [were] resolved."3 8 The appellate court then added:

"Time is of the essence for . .. children in [a] dependency
system." . . . [T]he court's failure to comply with the express

requirements of the law significantly disrupts what was supposed to
be a permanent guardianship, leav[ing] the child's status in a
continuing state of uncertainty, subject[ing] the child to [a] risk of
harm, and requir[ing] immediate relief that cannot be provided at
some uncertain future time on plenary appeal.
In a third case, a mother appealed from an order granting the state's
motion for reunification with her two children, closing the case as to a third
child, and placing that third child with the father.4 0 The appellate court held,
quite simply, that an evidentiary hearing must be held where there are disputed
facts concerning the "detriment to the child," allowing an offending parent to
contest the issue. 4 1 As "the [trial] court made findings of fact without
conducting an evidentiary hearing," this was a reversible error.42

31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
102 So. 3d 707 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
34.
Id. at 708.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
B.D., 102 So. 3d at 710.
39.
Id. at 711 (citation omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.621(1) (2013)).
40.
B.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 114 So. 3d 243, 244 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2013) (per curiam).
41.
Id. at 249.
42.
Id.
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For over two decades, the Florida courts have dealt with dependency
determinations based upon prospective neglect. In the leading case, Padgett v.
DepartmentofHealth & RehabilitativeServices," the Supreme Court of Florida
held that in order to make a finding of prospective neglect, there must be "a
nexus between the parent's problem and the potential for future neglect." The
issue arose again in J. V v. Departmentof Children & Family Services (In re
Interest ofJj V.). 4 6 In that case, a father appealed an order adjudicating his son
dependent.47 The basis for the petition to adjudicate the child dependent was
that the father was a danger to the son because the father was a member of the
Bloods gang; the police officer testified that the father's gang involvement was
proven by his numerous tattoos. 4 8 The twenty-three year old father obtained
some of the tattoos as a teenager. 49 Both the DCF and the Guardian Ad Litem
("GAL") Program conceded error, and the appellate court recognized that while
tattoos may indicate previous gang association, there was nothing to indicate his
involvement in any criminal activity since he was released from prison two
years earlier; further, all other testimony was that he "had been . . . diligent in

visiting his son and offering financial support."o
Finally, in a case of first impression, perhaps nationally, in R.L.R. v.
5
State, ' a seventeen-year-old minor in a dependency case sought a writ of
mandamus to compel a reversal of the trial court's order, "directing the [child's]
Attorneys Ad Litem [("AAL")] to disclose the [child's] whereabouts," to whom
the child had formerly provided this information and requested that it not be
shared. 5 2 The trial court "recognize[d] the attorney-client privilege, but [found]
the disclosure [was] required 'for the proper administration of justice."'" 3
Finding no exception to the attorney-client privilege that would support the trial

See I MICHAEL J.DALE ETAL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT y 4.14(4)(d)
43.
(2013); Dale, 2011 Survey ofJuvenile Law, supranote 9, at 182; Michael J.Dale, 2004 Survey of
FloridaJuvenile Law, 29 NOVA L. REV. 397, 413 (2005).
577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
44.
See id. at 568, 571; see also S.T. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re
45.
Interest of K.C. & D.C.), 87 So. 3d 827, 833-34 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); R.M. v. Dep't of
Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of J.B.), 40 So. 3d 917, 918 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(citing N.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of T.B.), 939 So. 2d 1192, 1194
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
99 So. 3d 578, 579 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
46.
47.
Id. at 578.
48.
Id. at 579.
Id.
49.
Id. at 578, 580.
50.
116 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
51.
Id. at 571, 572 n.2.
52.
53.
Id at 571.
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court's order to disclose, the appellate court reversed.5 4 In doing so, it relied in
part on the brief of amicus curiae the Florida Association of Counsel for
Children, the Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia, the National Association of
Counsel for Children, and the Youth Law Center of San Francisco 5 5 for the
proposition that any exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege in certain lower
court cases were inapposite. 56 Finally, the appellate court recognized that
"[c]ourts and legislatures in other jurisdictions have recognized and enforced
the attorney-client privilege in dependency proceedings."
III.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

Just as parents are statutorily entitled to counsel in dependency
proceedings in Florida by statute, they are entitled to counsel in TPR
proceedings as a matter of constitutional right.5 8 The same court in Miami that
failed to provide counsel in a dependency case in G. W. v. Department of
Children & Families59 during the course of a staccato-case shelter hearing-as
discussed in last year's survey article60-was reversed in F.M. v. State
Department of Children & Families,6 ' when it defaulted a father in a

termination of parental rights case when he failed to appear personally, although
he appeared telephonically at the advisory hearing. At that hearing, as quoted
by the appellate court, both the mother and father appeared by telephone.63
"When the judge discovered the father was appearing telephonically, the
following brief exchange took place":
The Court [calling]:
supposed to be here.

Well that [is] not good enough.

You're

The Father [calling]: I could [not] afford it.
The Court [calling]: Well, that [is] really too bad.
DCF [calling]: How is he on the phone?
54.
Id. at 573-74.
55.
Brief on file with the Nova Law Review.
56.
R.L.R., 116 So. 3d at 571, 573 n.5.
57.
Id. at 574 n.8.
58.
In re Interest of D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980); Dale, 2011
Survey ofJuvenile Law, supra note 9, at 179.
59.
92 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
60.
Michael J. Dale, 2012 Survey ofFloridaJuvenile Law, 37 NoVA L. REV. 333,
334 (2013) [hereinafter Dale, 2012 Survey ofJuvenile Law].
61.
95 So. 3d 378 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
62.
Id. at 382-83.
63.
Id. at 380.
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The Court [calling]: Okay, so go ahead.
Counsel for the mother: With the mother?
DCF [calling]: No, that [is the father]. Judge, well, [the father] is
present via phone. There is publication. His attorney over there [in
Louisiana] was noticed to be present.
The Court [calling]: He is not present. I am granting the termination
of parental rights and closing the case. Mr. M. has no contact with
his children.

The Court [calling]: ... Well, he [is] not here, and a default has been
issued. Mr. M., your parental rights have been terminated and you
have no contact whatsoever with these children.6
Citing prior case law to the effect that the "'termination of parental
rights [ought] never be determined on a default basis or by gotcha practices
when [the] parent makes a reasonable [attempt] to be present at [the] hearing
and is delayed by circumstances beyond [that parent's] control,"' the appellate
court reversed the termination of parental rights.
The issue of whether parental rights can be terminated based upon the
abuse of a sibling or another child in the family, is predicated upon a showing
of a totality of the circumstances surrounding the current petition by applying
the Padgettnexus test.66 The issue before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
A.i v. Department of Children & Families67 was whether a father's parental

rights to five children should be terminated because, while there was proof of
sexual abuse as to two daughters, the record did not provide support for a
finding harm or a risk of harm with regard to their two brothers.6 8 While there
was evidence of mental health problems with the two boys, it was unclear if the
issues stemmed from the domestic abuse. On that basis, the appellate court
reversed as to the brothers.70

64.

Id. at 380-81 (alteration in original).

65.
Id. at 381,382-83 (quoting B.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 882 So. 2d
1099, 1100 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
66.
Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla.
1991).
67.
97 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
68.
Id. at 986.
69.
Id. at 987-88.
Id. at 986.
70.
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In G.O. v. Department of Children & Families,' the appellate court
reversed as a matter of statutory construction because the general magistrate
who presided over the advisory hearing found that the parents gave constructive
consent for TPR by not appearing, and later allowed the guardian ad litem to
testify as to the child's best interest. 72 The trial court signed an order that
conformed to the general magistrate recommendation for TPR. Under Florida
law, general magistrates are prohibited from presiding over advisory hearings.74
The hearing at which the guardian ad litem testified "was an adjudicatory
hearing on the petition for [TPR]."7 The appellate court reversed, since the
proper court presiding over the adjudicatory hearing should have been the trial
court. 76
The rights of putative fathers in TPR and adoption cases are limited in
Florida by statute.77 In only one case, HeartofAdoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 8 has the
Supreme Court of Florida addressed the constitutionality of the adoption statute
as it relates to putative fathers. 79 In S.C v. Gift ofLife Adoptions,so an adoption
agency filed a petition to terminate a father's parental rights as a precursor to an
adoption involving a biological mother who intended to place the child up for
adoption with the agency. 8 ' The appellate court affirmed and granted the
petition to terminate the putative father's parental rights, but avoided any
constitutional claim, finding that there was abandonment, which independently
supported the granting of the petition.82 The father had argued that he was not
appointed counsel in a timely fashion "until the first hearing on the petition."8 1
The court did recognize "that the filing requirements [were] very technical and
might be a challenge to the nonlawyer biological father," 84 and in his
concurrence, Judge Davis expressed his concern that unwed biological fathers

71.
72.

100 So. 3d 232 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 233.

73.

Id.

74.
75.

FLA.

76.

Id.

R. Juv. P. 8.257(h); G.O., 100 So. 3d at 233.
G.O., 100 So. 3d at 233.

77.
FLA. STAT. §§ 63.053(1), .054(1) (2013).
78.
963 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2007).
79.
Id. at 191. See Michael J. Dale, 2007-2008 Survey ofJuvenile Law, 33 NOVA
L. REv. 357, 388 (2009) [hereinafter Dale, 2007-2008 Survey ofJuvenile Law] for a discussion of
the possible constitutional infirmities in the Florida law.
80.
100 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
81.
Id. at 774-75.
82.
Id. at 775.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
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should be entitled to all the due process rights of other parties, including the
right to counsel.
IV.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

The question of how indirect criminal contempt applies in juvenile
delinquency cases was before the Supreme Court of Florida in J.M. v. Gargett
(J.M. II).86 The specific issue was whether, when an adjudicated delinquent
violates a single probation order on multiple occasions, that juvenile may be
held in contempt and placed in a secure detention facility for consecutive
periods. 87 In the case at bar, the juvenile was placed on probation and was held
in indirect criminal contempt as a result of violating curfew, as well as violation
of a second order to obey household rules. 8 The juvenile was placed in secure
detention for both offenses; five days for the first offense and fifteen days for
the second.89 Specifically, after the first period was satisfied, the second period
began. 90 The Supreme Court of Florida-recognizing a split in opinions
between the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal-held that the
consecutive sentences could properly be instituted. 91 Justices Quince and
Pariente dissented on the grounds that there was "only a single act of indirect
92
contempt" under the Florida dependency statute.
In the second case before the Supreme Court of Florida this year, the
issue involved a school-related matter.93 Juveniles are often the subject of
delinquency cases that arise out of events which occur at school.94 The issue in
JR. v. State95 was whether a juvenile could be found to have committed a
trespass on school grounds without evidence that the juvenile had formerly been
warned by the school principal's designee for trespassing.9 6 The Supreme Court
S.C., 100 So. 3d at 776 (Davis, J., concurring).
85.
86.
101 So. 3d 352, 353 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
87.
Id. at 355.
88.
Id. at 353.
89.
Id.
Id. at 353-54.
90.
JM. II, 101 So. 3d at 356-57. CotnpareJ.M.1, 53 So. 3d 1245, 1247 (Fla. 2d
91.
Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 58 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision), aff'd, 101
So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam), with M.P. v. State, 988 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2008).
92.
JM. II, 101 So. 3d at 357 (Quince, J., dissenting).
J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 427 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
93.
94.
See 2 MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT $ 10.07(1)
(2013).
99 So. 3d 427 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
95.
96.
Id. at 427 (citing D.J. v. State, 43 So. 3d 176, 177 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review granted,47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010) (unpublished table decision), and quashed, 67 So. 3d
1029 (Fla. 2011)).
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of Florida held that the failure to present evidence at trial that the individuals
who warned the child were designees of the school's principal was reversible
error.97 In addition, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial court failed
to properly comply with the conditions for taking judicial notice under Florida's
rules of evidence.
The third case in the Supreme Court of Florida was Hopkins v. State
(Hopkins II),99 in which the court decided the question of whether a detainee's

act of battery at ajuvenile detention center, and charged with battery falls under
Florida's criminal law within this setting.'" Resolving a question of conflict
between the First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal-as a matter of statutory
construction-the court found that a detention center does qualify as a detention
facility for purposes of the criminal law.' 0'
In what would seem like a simple proposition, juvenile court
jurisdiction over a subject child in delinquency ends at age nineteen. I2 In State
v. E.I.,' 0 3 the appellate court-in a one-paragraph opinion-dismissed the
State's appeal as moot, as the juvenile had reached his nineteenth birthday.I 04
However, the court explained that the trial court was correct and that its
jurisdiction ends over any child at any time after the juvenile's nineteenth
birthday, "[u]nless [the] child is already under commitment, in a transition
program, or subject to a restitution order."' 05
The rules concerning a determination of whether a juvenile is
incompetent to proceed in a delinquency case are quite clear. 0 6 Among them is
the provision that the court must base its competency determination on the
evaluation of at least "two . . . experts appointed by the court."0 7 In State v.

D. V.,08 following an unauthorized absence, the juvenile was charged with
threatening school personnel.' The juvenile allegedly slapped another student

97.
Id. at 430.
98.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.201(1) (2013).
99.
105 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 2012).
100.
Id. at 471.
101.
Id.; see also State v. Hopkins (Hopkins 1), 47 So. 3d 974, 975 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2010), review granted,63 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision), aff'd, 105
So. 3d 470 (Fla. 2012); T.C. v. State, 852 So. 2d 276, 276 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (per
curiam).
102.
FLA. STAT. § 985.0301(5)(a).
103.
114 So. 3d 309 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
104.
Id. at 310.
Id.
105.
106.
See FLA. STAT. § 985.19.
107.
Id. § 985.19(1)(b).
108.
Ill So. 3d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).

109.

Id. at 235.
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seven weeks later. " o Formerly, the juvenile had been adjudicated incompetent
to proceed after allegations were raised with respect to the commission other
crimes. "' The first expert appointed by the court evaluated the mental
condition of the child and "determined that [the child] was not competent to
proceed."I 12 The court did not appoint a second expert, relying upon an earlier
report from an expert who had been appointed by the Department of Children
and Families, on the grounds that one could save money in so doing."' The
appellate court reversed, finding that as a matter of statutory construction the
trial court is required to base determinations of competency on the evaluations
of at least two court-appointedexperts."4 As the court only appointed one
expert, reversal was required." 5
Issues of the suppression of inculpatory statements by juveniles have
been the source of discussion in this survey on a number of occasions."' 6 In
State v. MR.,'' 7 one of the issues on appeal was whether a statement that the
juvenile-who was subsequently "charged in a petition for ... possession with
intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver cannabis within 1000 feet of a school"made in front of his mother and in the presence of a police officer could be
suppressed." 8 The police officer had called the mother, and when the mother
arrived, the juvenile was sitting, handcuffed, in the rear of a police car in
custody and in the presence of the officer." 9 The child said to his mother that
he did not wish to talk to her in the presence of a police "officer and that she. . .
knew why he was selling marijuana." 2 0 In this case, the respondent child did
not request to speak with the third person-his mother-but rather, it was the
police officer that brought the mother to the scene.121 The court held that "these
statements . . . were an exploitation of the initial illegality," citing a prior

District Court of Appeal case as distinguishable in Lundberg v. State.'2 2
This survey does not usually discuss evidentiary issues, as they are
generic in nature and not necessarily specific to juvenile delinquency cases.
110.
Id.
Ill.
Id.
Id.at 235-36.
112.
D. V.,III So. 3d at 236-37.
113.
Id. at 237.
114.
115.
Id.
See Michael J.Dale, 2010 Survey ofJuvenile Law, 35 NOVA L. REv. 137,151
116.
(2010); Dale, 2007-2008 Survey ofJuvenile Law, supra note 79, at 384-85.
100 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
117.
Id. at 274, 279-80.
118.
119.
Id. at 275, 280-81.
Id. at 275.
120.
Id. at 275, 280-81.
121.
MR., 100 So. 3d at 280-81 (citing Lundberg v. State, 918 So. 2d 444, 445
122.
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
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However, on occasion, the issue is germane to juvenile delinquency law.' 2 3 In
D.D.B. v. State, 24 the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that the
juvenile called '911 for the purpose of making a false alarm or complaint or
reporting false information."' 25 In an adjudicatory hearing, "the State . . .
introduce[d] an audio recording of [the] two calls purportedly made." 26 The
problem was quite simple.12 7 The identification of the child's voice on the
recording required "authentication, [which] would also require . . . evidence,

including [the fact] that the recording was of a telephone call received and
handled by the 911 system on the relevant date." 28 Since there was no such
evidence under section 90.901 of the Florida Evidence Code, the court was
obligated to reverse.129
The second evidentiary matter, also seemingly basic in nature, arose in
K.A.A. v. State. 3 0 In that case a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for the
unlawful possession of gun on school property. 3 ' The trial court would not
allow the respondent "to cross-examine the State's juvenile witness about
criminal charges pending against the witness."' 32 Citing an earlier case to the
effect that "'[t]he right to cross-examine witnesses . .. outweighs the [interest of
the State] in preserving the confidentiality ofjuvenile delinquency records,'" 3 3
the appellate court reversed. 34 It ought to have been obvious that the
prosecution witness's credibility would be an issue.
It has been forty-six years since the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled in In re Gault36 that children have the right to counsel in juvenile
delinquency cases.' 37 In C W. v. State,3 3 a juvenile appealed from an order
adjudicating her as delinquent based upon a battery on a law enforcement
officer. 39 The issue was the court's action in taking the case to trial in the
123.

See, e.g., D.D.B. v. State, 109 So. 3d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

109 So. 3d 1184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1185.
See id.
Id.
D.D.B., 109 So. 3d at 1185; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.901 (2013).
109 So. 3d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Tuell v. State, 905 So. 2d 929, 930 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
See K.A.A., 109 So. 3d at 1176.
387 U.S. I (1967).
Id. at 41, 55.
93 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at515.
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absence of a lawyer for the child.14 0 At the child's arraignment, the child
indicated that she hired an attorney.141 The court asked if she was sure that she
would have the attorney represent her, since the attorney had not yet filed any
pleadings.14 2 On the date of trial, the child indicated that she was not sure
where her attorney was, and the court said that it was going to trial.14 3 After the
trial, but before the disposition, an attorney was hired and filed a motion for
rehearing.'" Incredibly, the court denied the motion for rehearing, noting that
the child "'did indeed have a fair trial."'" 45 Citing to the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure which require notification of the right to counsel at each
stage of the proceeding and-if the child chooses to waive counsel-conducting
a thorough inquiry to determine if the waiver was freely and intelligently made,
the appellate court reversed.146
In Florida, determinations of whether an alleged juvenile delinquent is
to be securely detained are based upon the use of a Risk Assessment Instrument
("RAI"). 47 In J.L.B. v. Kelly,148 a juvenile petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, challenging the validity of the detention during the course of the
juvenile delinquency proceeding.149 Although he was released from detention
while his writ was pending-and thus the matter was moot-the court on appeal
ruled that "improper scoring of [a RAI] ... is capable of repetition yet evading
review," and thus it resolved the issue. "o The claim involved impermissible
double scoring.'"' The trial court added points to the scoring process on the
basis of two factors: "[T]he high risk nature of [a] prior commitment and the
circumstances of the current burglary offense." 52 The problem was that by
doing so, the court impermissibly double-scored by acknowledging
circumstances that had already been taken into account by the RAI, there was
nothing in the State statute that would allow the court to do so.'

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
C W., 93 So. 3d at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 515-16 (quoting FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165(a), (b)(2)).
Dale, 2007-2008 Survey ofJuvenile Law, supra note 79, at 380-81.
93 So. 3d 1137 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id.at 1138.
Id. (citing T.T. v. Esteves, 828 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

151.
152.
153.

Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1138.
JL.B., 93 So. 3d at 1139 (citing

2002)).

FLA. STAT.

§ 985.24 (2013)).

94

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

The State charged a juvenile with felony criminal mischief-valued at
$1000 or more-for $2600 of damage to an automobile.1 54 The auto body shop
owner testified in support of the value of the damage, based on an employee's
estimate.155 The estimate was made in the regular course of business, but the
estimate was never admitted into evidence.' 5 6 When the trial court refused to
strike the oral testimony, trial counsel objected, and the matter in A.S. v. States 7
went up on appeal.' 5 8 The appellate court reversed on the basis of the Florida
Rules of Evidence, specifically section 90.803(6), regarding the business
records exception to hearsay.' 59 Here, the estimate itself would have qualified
as a business record.160 "[H]owever, the testimony explaining the contents of
the estimate," where the estimate was not in evidence, did not fall within the
exception.' 6 ' As a result, there was no competent proof of the underlying felony
crime and the court reversed.162
Restitution issues come up regularly at the dispositional stage of
delinquency cases in Florida; issues also regularly discussed in this survey.' 63 A
blatantly obvious reversal took place in XG. v. State,16 where the juvenile
appealed from the revocation ofjuvenile probation where the court's basis for
revocation and probation was the failure to pay restitution.' 6 5 The problem
concerned a plea agreement, which stated that "no restitution would be ordered
on the [underlying] charge." 66 Thus, the disposition order did not list
restitution as a condition of probation. 67
In A.P. v. State,168 the issue was whether there was sufficient evidence
to support a restitution order.16 9 The source of the evidence resulting in an order
of $220 in restitution was the victim's testimony, which was based upon the

154.
A.S. v. State, 91 So. 3d 270, 271 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
91 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
158.
See id. at 271.
159.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6)(a) (2013) (amended by Act effective
May 30, 2013, ch. 2013-98, § 1, 2013 Fla. Laws 1, 1-2).
160.
A.S., 91 So. 3d at 271.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Dale, 2012 Survey ofJuvenile Law, supra note 60, at 346; Michael J. Dale,
2009 Survey ofJuvenile Law, 34 NOVA L. REV. 199, 216 (2009); Dale, 2007-2008 Survey of
Juvenile Law, supra note 79, at 378.
164.
106 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
165.
Id. at 91.
166.
Id. at 90.
167.
Id.
168.
114 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
169.
Id. at 395.
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replacement value of the item, and the source of the testimony was unknown.o70
Thus, according to the appellate court, the State failed to present competent
substantial evidence of the item's fair market value.' 7'
Among the requirements at the dispositional stage of the delinquency
proceeding in Florida, is that the court strictly comply with the statutory
provisions governing proper procedure at a juvenile disposition hearing.' 7 2 In
K.P. v. State,'73 while the court ordered a predisposition psychiatric evaluation
of the child, the court entered a dispositional order before the psychiatric
evaluation was available. 7 4 That constituted failure to strictly comply with the
statutory procedures, and the appellate court reversed.17 5 Similarly, at the
dispositional stage, the trial court is obligated to prepare a written dispositional
order that complies with its oral pronouncements. 176 In L.D. v. State, 77 the trial
court failed to do so.' It was conceded that the court's written dispositional
order was not consistent with its oral pronouncements. 79 On the basis of the
lower court's failure to comply with the statutory obligations, the appellate
court reversed. 80
Similarly, in R. V. v. State,'8 ' the appellate court reversed the
dispositional order of the trial court because there had been no articulation
regarding why the dispositional alternative of a moderate risk commitment
program is more appropriate than the Department of Juvenile Justice's
recommendation that the child's rehabilitative needs should result in the least
restrictive setting. 182 The appellate court reversed, authorizing the "trial court
[to] amend [its] disposition[al] order to include the required findings." 8 3
Perhaps even harder to understand is the situation which required a
reversal of a disposition in MA.L. v. State.I84 In that case, the trial court
conducted a dispositional hearing outside of the appellant and her father's

170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
K.P. v. State, 97 So. 3d 966, 967 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (citing K.D. v.
State, 911 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005)); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2) (2013).
173.
97 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
174.
Id. at 967.
175.
Id.
176.
L.D. v. State, 107 So. 3d 514, 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also FLA.
STAT. § 985.43(2).
177.
107 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
178.
Id. at 515.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.43(2).
181.
107 So. 3d 535 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
182.
Id. at 536.
183.
Id.
184.
110 So. 3d 493, 495-96, 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
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presence, in a sidebar.'" The juvenile "claim[ed] that [the] sidebar conference
violated her due process rights to be present and meaningfully heard prior to the
disposition."' Shockingly, the State argued that this was harmless error.
The appellate court reversed, recognizing that the issue of disposition prior to
determination, in noncompliance with the Florida statute governing how the
hearing should be held, constituted fundamental error.'88
Under Florida law, there is a variety of dispositional alternatives in
addition to restitution;'89 such alternatives encompass placement in a various
residential facilities, including those described as high-risk.190 In D.H. v.
State,'9 ' the trial court committed a youth to a high-risk facility for a
misdemeanor offense in its dispositional order.' 9 2 Florida law limits the trial
court's commitment authority and placement of the juvenile misdemeanant in a
high-risk facility. 9 Thus, the most restrictive facility to which the child could
be sent was a moderate-risk facility; therefore, the appellate court reversed.' 9 4
In G. W. v. State,'95 juveniles in three consolidated appeals challenged
the constitutionality of a FloridaStatute governing sentencing enhancement
when the crime committed was against a school officer.19 6 The appeal was
based on equal protection grounds and the appellants claimed that the statute
created 'an elite class of untouchables' because of the additional protection
provided by the law to school employees. 197 Applying a rational basis equal
protection test,' 98 the appellate court affirmed, finding no constitutional
infirmity in the statute.' 99
In two major cases decided over the past four years, the Supreme Court
of the United States dealt with questions of appropriate punishment for
individuals who were juveniles at the time they committed their crimes. 200 In
185.
Id. at 495.
186.
Id. at 496.
187.
Id.
188.
Id. at 496, 499; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.433(4)(d) (2013).
189.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 985.437, with id. § 985.441.
190.
Id. § 985.441(1)(b); see also id. § 985.03(46).
191.
114 So. 3d 496 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
192.
Id. at 497-98.
193.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 985.441(2)).
194.
Id. at 498.
195.
106 So. 3d 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 118 So. 3d 220 (Fla.
2013) (unpublished table decision).
196.
Id. at 84; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.081(2).
197.
G. W., 106 So. 3d at 84.
198.
Id. at 85 (citing Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993, 996
(Fla. 2003)).
199.
Id. at 86; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.081(2).
200.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,2017-18 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 555-56 (2005).
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Roper v. Simmons, 20 1 the Court held that the death penalty for individuals who

committed criminal offenses while juveniles was unconstitutional in violation of
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 2 02 In
20 3
the Court held that life without the possibility of parole
Graham v. Florida,
for a juvenile was also unconstitutional in a felony murder setting where the
juvenile did not commit the homicide.m Then, in Miller v. Alabama,0 s the
Court ruled that state sentencing statutes making life imprisonment without
parole appropriately mandatory for juvenile non-homicide offenders also
violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.2 06 In three intermediate appellate court opinions decided this past
survey year, the courts dealt with the application of Graham and Miller to three
juveniles tried as adults. 207 The first case is Walling v. State.20 8 There, the
defendant, who was sixteen at the time of the offense, was convicted of felony
murder for participating in the planning of the robbery and supplying the gun,
although he had been "waiting a few blocks away when the fatal shot was
fired." 20 9 He was tried as an adult by a six-person jury. 210 The appellate court
held that under Roper, Graham, and Miller, the juvenile was not entitled to a
twelve-person jury because the twelve-person jury is required when death is a
possible penalty and that death no longer controls the question of a jury's size
when the case involves a juvenile. 21 I
In Reynolds v. State,212 the defendant had been found guilty by a jury
and sentenced to life in prison on one count of robbery with a firearm in
2002.213 The appellate court vacated the sentence of life without parole under
Graham.2 14 The second issue before the court on remand was "'the concept of
aggregate sentencing on interdependent offenses, as it relates to [the] trial
judge's desire to effect the original sentencing plan."' 215 The appellate court
201.
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
See id. at 578.
202.
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
203.
Id. at 2034.
204.
205.
132 S. Ct 2455 (2012).
Id. at 2475.
206.
See Reynolds v. State, 116 So. 3d 558, 559 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013);
207.
Young v. State, 110 So. 3d 931,931-32 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 2013 Fla. LEXIS
2223 (Fla. Oct. 10, 2013); Walling v. State, 105 So. 3d 660, 661-62 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2013).
208.
105 So. 3d 660, 660 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
209.
Id. at 661-62.
210.
Id. at 662.
Id.
211.
212.
116 So. 3d 558 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
213.
Id. at 559.
Id.
214.
215.
Id. at 562 (quoting Fasenmyer v. State, 457 So. 2d 1361, 1366 (Fla. 1984)).
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held that there is no right to "'modification, on remand after appeal, of [the]
sentences on convictions [that were] not challenged on [the original] appeal.' 2 16
The appellate court further acknowledged the lack of legal decisions on point
with this issue after the Supreme Court of the United States' opinion in
Graham,although it recognized general support for the proposition.2 17 Finally,
as the court noted that it was not unconstitutional for a juvenile to receive a life
sentence for a non-homicide crime.218 Rather, it "is unconstitutional ... for the
State not to give 2[the]
juvenile offender[]. . . 'some meaningful opportunity to
19

obtain release."'

In a third post-Graham decision, Young v. State,22 0 the juvenile was
sentenced to four consecutive thirty-year sentences and then was resentenced
pursuant to Graham.22 ' One of the issues the defendant raised on appeal was
that the trial court violated Graham by "fail[ing] to consider [his] rehabilitation
and newfound maturity."222 The juvenile's claim was that he was entitled to a
hearing to prove his change in circumstances. 223 The appellate court rejected
this argument under Graham.224 Under the facts of the case, because the
juvenile was sentenced to a term of thirty years in prison, after which he would
be released, he did have a sentence that specifically provided for his eventual
release.22 5 Therefore, Graham did not apply.226 Finally, the appellate court held
that a resentencing hearing does not require the opportunity to review
rehabilitation.22 7 On those bases, the court affirmed.228
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Florida decided three important technical matters
in the delinquency field this past survey year.229 In dependency and termination
of parental rights cases, the intenediate appellate courts decided a large
216.
Id. (quoting Fasenmyer, 457 So. 2d at 1366).
217.
Reynolds, 116 So. 3d at 562.
218.
Id. at 563.
219.
Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)).
220.
110 So. 3d 931 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. SC 13-929, 2013
WL 5614109 (Fla. 2013).
221.
Id. at 931-32 (citing Grahan, 130 S. Ct. at 2034).
Id. at 932.
222.
223.
Id.
224.
Id. at 933.
225.
Young, I 10 So. 3d at 934.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
228.
Id. at 936.
229.
See J.M. II, 101 So. 3d 352, 353 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); Hopkins II, 105 So.
3d 470, 471 (Fla. 2012); J.R. v. State, 99 So. 3d 427, 430 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
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number of cases, a number of which involved obvious and basic failures to
comply with Chapter 39 by the trial courts.230 One case in particular, R.L.R. v.
State, was particularly noteworthy, as it upheld the right of a juvenile to
confidentiality with his volunteer AAL in a dependency case, over the
objections of the GAL Program and the DCF.m

230.
See, e.g., A.J. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 97 So. 3d 985, 986-87 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
R.L.R. v. State, 116 So. 3d 570, 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
231.

